Evaluation of the implementation process of urban road pricing schemes in the United Kingdom and Italy by Ieromonachou, Petros et al.
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 49-68 
 49
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the implementation process of urban 
road pricing schemes in the United Kingdom and Italy 
 
Petros Ieromonachou 1∗, Stephen Potter 1, James P. Warren 1 
 
1 Centre for Technology Strategy, Department of Design and Innovation, Faculty of Technology, The 
Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper is based upon detailed research that has taken place in the UK and Italy, on the 
implementation strategies for urban road pricing schemes. In the UK, both in London and Durham, the 
Road User Charging schemes required new legislation, and were implemented rapidly. The time from 
announcement to implementation took three years and the schemes were introduced after short periods of 
intensive planning, consultations and stakeholder networking. In Italy, the situation has been very 
different. The road pricing schemes in Rome and Genoa were not introduced under specific legislation 
but rather evolved from access control zones originally implemented in historic urban centres. The 
incremental introduction of the Italian road pricing experiments has taken approximately ten years. 
The paper undertakes a comparison of these different strategies to introduce urban road pricing and the 
lessons they contain for the development of similar measures elsewhere. The comparison of the different 
implementing experiences is undertaken using Strategic Policy Niche Management, a method designed to 
explore, among other factors, the dynamics of the stakeholder networks involved in planning, introducing, 
marketing and managing radical urban Travel Demand Management policies. 
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1. Congestion and road pricing 
 
The car has evolved from an expensive luxury for a few to become an important tool 
for the everyday lives and employment for the majority of people, a status symbol and a 
leisure pursuit. Increased use of private vehicles has not only brought benefits. For 
many years congestion was little more than a localised problem. Today it has become 
endemic, not just for major cities but even in many rural regions. Associated with traffic 
congestion, are the related problems of air pollution, emissions of CO2, together with 
more subtle lifestyle effects, such as contributing to less healthy lifestyles and transport 
poverty. 
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As early as the 1920’s economists (Knight, 1924; Pigou, 1920) recognised road 
pricing as a simple way for taxing the external costs of transportation – congestion, 
accident risks, noise and emissions of pollutants (Maddison et al., 1996; Rietveld, 
2001). Ramjerdi (1996) argued that road pricing requires road users to pay for their 
marginal social costs. Santos and Newbery (2001) suggested that “the traditional 
approach to the economies of congestion rests on the standard welfare economic 
argument that the market failure of congestion requires a corrective charge to 
internalise the externality”. Paulley (2002) identified that fiscal restraints, whether by 
road pricing or tax on environmental pollution, offer a method of clearly identifying to 
users the external costs of their actions. A wide literature has developed advocating that 
road access be subject to some form of marginal cost pricing (Button, 2004; Ison, 2004; 
Ramjerdi, 1996; Smeed, 1964; Vickrey, 1963). The urban road user charging examples 
presented in this paper have been more pragmatic in practice, by seeking to achieve 
urban and transport goals rather than an idealised pricing system. 
Although road user charges for motorways, bridges and tunnels are common in some 
countries, urban road pricing schemes are rare and have been the subject of much 
controversy. Despite the use of a variety of names, most urban road pricing examples 
operate as either cordon or area charge schemes. Cordon charging involves charging 
drivers for entering a specific area – usually the historical city centre or central business 
district. The charge can be levied using manual methods – either by manned toll booths 
or coin operated machines, and automatic methods – simple read/write tags or smart 
card technology. Successful examples of cordon charging (urban toll rings) are found 
mainly in Norway where seven cities have adopted the measure to date (Ieromonachou 
et al., 2004, Wærsted, 2005). Some Italian cities have adopted the cordon system that 
evolved from previously introduced access control schemes. Rome is also 
experimenting with smart card technology that would allow enforcement throughout the 
charged area not only for access but also for parking. Area-based schemes charge 
vehicles for being within a specified area. The first area-based charged scheme in the 
world began in Singapore in 1975. This scheme was based on a license system that 
allowed permit holders to access or travel within the charged area. The London 
‘congestion charging’ scheme begun in 2003 operates as an area-based charging 
scheme. 
This paper forms part of a wider project comparing the organisation and 
implementation of urban road pricing schemes. As examples, two UK and two Italian 
cities are presented and then analysed. The analysis is conducted using Strategic Policy 
Niche Management, an evolving method, developed to identify and evaluate key factors 
in the introduction of complex and radical transport policies. 
 
 
2. Strategic Policy Niche Management 
 
Strategic Policy Niche Management has been developed from Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM), an organisational innovation diffusion theory that explores the 
processes and actors needed in shaping, and the application of, new technologies 
(Weber et al, 1999; Hoogma et al, 2002). SNM analyses experiments with new 
technology solutions within a dominant technological regime (e.g. an electric vehicle 
demonstration project). Such projects constitute a ‘protected space’ for technology 
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shaping, which is called a ‘niche’, with niche protection usually involving financial and 
organisational support. Learning occurs within the protected niche and the goal is to 
eventually expose the new technology to real-world conditions where it will, or will not, 
survive (Schot et al., 1994). SNM analysis structures the processes, roles and 
relationships between partners involved in such experiments. 
Strategic Niche Management was developed in the context of transport technology 
projects. However, behind these specific technologies there has been some form of 
policy initiative (Hoogma et al., 2002, p 202). Experiments with new urban transport 
policy instruments do occur, but they are not used to systematically learn about possible 
new linkages between technology, information needs and issues of social and political 
acceptability. For example, Parkhurst (2000) noted the way in which lessons for Park 
and Ride schemes were not transferred and each new project repeated mistakes of 
earlier schemes. A policy adaptation of SNM called Strategic Policy Niche Management 
(SPNM) has been used to analyse more radical policies that are difficult to implement or 
to transfer between situations as they challenge the dominant regime (Ieromonachou et 
al. 2004; 2005). Examples of these policies include urban road pricing, workplace 
parking charging mechanisms as well as employer-level Travel Demand Management 
(TDM), like travel plans. 
SPNM helps in identifying critical information, processes and actors in the planning, 
introduction and implementation of the policies, the barriers that planners face during 
implementation (social, political, institutional, financial), and the different information 
needs for each step in the process. Use of SPNM can help transport planners understand 
how various 'regimes' change from one set of local conditions to another. It can also 
find ways of expressing strong similarities for niches which seem to have striking 
differences, yet may be very similar in their core motivation (e.g. road pricing and travel 
plans). 
 
 
3. United Kingdom 
 
The following two cases provide information on two existing road user charging 
schemes in the UK, namely London and Durham. The concept of road pricing was 
‘revived’ in the early 1960s both by British and American transport academics (Smeed, 
1964; Vickrey, 1963) that saw it as one of the few solutions left to deal with the ever-
growing problems associated with road congestion. Road user charging (RUC) had been 
proposed in the UK several times since the Smeed report, but there were no serious 
attempts to practically introduce the policy, with exception a trial in the city of 
Cambridge in the early 1990s. For a number of reasons, most notably the lack of 
political support, the Cambridge scheme failed to progress beyond the field trial (Ison, 
2004). Legislation for road pricing measures in the UK has been encouraged in recent 
years through the UK Transport White paper ‘A New Deal for Transport: Better for 
Everyone’ (DETR, 1998a) and the following daughter document – ‘Breaking the 
Logjam’ (DETR, 1998b). The 2000 Transport Act (HMG, 2000) contains powers for 
local authorities to introduce ‘road user charging’ schemes provided they form part of 
an integrated transport plan. The legislation allowing for the implementation of 
congestion charging in Central London was made available earlier under the Greater 
London Act (HMG, 1999). 
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3.1 London’s congestion charge 
 
Central London had long established and serious traffic congestion. Over the years, a 
number of measures had been implemented to tackle the problem but none managed to 
do so effectively. The Congestion Charge scheme was introduced in February  2003, 
following an intense planning and advertising campaign led by Mayor Ken Livingstone. 
A fee of £5 GBP (€7.3)1 was initially2 charged to motorists entering a central zone of a 
5km radius between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6.30 p.m. on weekdays (TfL, 2003). The £5 
charge was expected to deter 10-15% of vehicles entering the zone and reduce journey 
times by 25% but in practice reduced cars by around 20% and congestion by 30% 
compared with the last few weeks before charging (TfL, 2004). This better than 
expected impact upon traffic reduced the revenue generated from an expected £130m 
(€190m) to around £90m (€131m) (Ison, 2004). 
The charged area represents only 1.3% of the total Greater London area but around 
200,000 vehicles drive into the charging zone every day. From these, the charge applies 
to about 110,000. The remaining are exempt vehicles: 100% reduction to taxis, 
emergency vehicles, disabled badge holders as well as other groups and 90% reduction 
to residents of the zone (TfL, 2004). A network of 700 video cameras in 230 positions 
throughout the charging zone, 174 of which are on the inner ring road, enforce the 
scheme (TfL, 2003). There are also a number of mobile units with cameras that patrol 
within the zone (see Figure 1). Payment can be made to any of the 9,500 UK-wide Pay 
Points, at various petrol stations and shops throughout the UK. Payments can also be 
made by phone, SMS text, or the internet (TfL, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1: A mobile camera unit. (Photo: S. Potter). 
 
The traffic impact outside the congestion charging zone has, contrary to expectations, 
been minimal. To accommodate modal transfer, 300 additional buses, offering 11,000 
places were added to the already extensive bus network of London increasing bus usage 
by more than 7%. Making radical improvements in bus services was one of the Mayor’s 
ten priorities for transport in London (TfL, 2004). The scheme also generated net 
                                                 
1 Exchange rate at time of writing £1 GBP ≈ €1.46 Euro. 
2 The charge was increased to £8 (€11.7) in July 2005. 
 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 49-68 
 53
revenues to generally improve transport in London. Plans for an extension of the 
charging zone westwards have been approved by the Mayor of London and are expected 
to become operational in February 2007 (TfL, 2005). 
 
 
3.2 Durham’s Road Access Charge 
 
As with the majority of transport projects, the background to the Durham scheme was 
very important to the outcome of the implementation process. Durham is in the North 
East of England and here the council had being trying to restrict city centre traffic to the 
‘Peninsula’ area since 1949. This area has been designated as a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site3 because of its religious and architectural significance (see Figure 2) and 
protecting it from traffic pollution was important.  
The area had particularly acute traffic problems. Of the 3000 vehicles that entered the 
area each day prior to the scheme being adopted, 50% used the road as a mobile parking 
area thus contributing short-term to congestion by slowing down traffic. Congestion was 
high because of the sheer number of vehicles and pedestrians concentrated in a small 
street – around 13,000 pedestrians accessed the area each weekday and 17,000 on 
Saturdays (DCC, 2000). The situation in the area was untenable, threatening the 
viability of local businesses and damaging the appeal of the Durham Peninsula as a 
World Heritage Site. 
Various measures had been proposed and tried over some 20 years, but failed to solve 
the problem. With the ineffectiveness of the conventional parking and traffic 
management scheme, 1997 saw the creation of Durham’s Transport Steering Group. 
This consisted of members of the City and County Council members and various 
representatives of the major stakeholders on the Peninsula, businesses and other 
establishments as well as the police and the Chamber of Trade. The agreed aim for the 
Peninsula was to significantly reduce the pedestrian and vehicular conflict by removing 
a substantial proportion of the existing traffic through a road user charge. 
 
 
Figure 2: A panoramic view of the Durham Peninsula, bounded by the river Wear. (DCC, 2002b). 
                                                 
3 There are 26 World Heritage Sites in the UK. For more details visit: http://www.culture.gov.uk/ 
historic_ environment/World_ Heritage.htm. 
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A key part of introducing the congestion charge was the provision of alternative 
means of access to the Peninsula, and discussions with public transport users resulted in 
the launch of a new minibus service that began operating some two months before the 
congestion charge was introduced (DCC, 2002a). Part-funded by the congestion charge, 
the ‘Cathedral Bus’ provides access to the Cathedral and Market Square with the Rail, 
Coach Stations and a Park and Ride car park. Overall, the cost of the project to 
implementation including the operating systems, buses and pedestrian improvements 
was £250,000 (€365,000), and was funded entirely through the Council’s Local 
Transport Plan (LTP) settlement. 
The Durham Road Access Charge Scheme began operating in October 2002, the first 
to take advantage of road user charging powers granted in the Transport Act 2000 
(HMG, 2000). The charging zone included the Cathedral and Castle, the University of 
Durham, the Chorister school, the market place area, other trading and servicing 
establishments and a small number of private dwellings. Motorists pay a £2 (€2.95) 
charge to exit the area on Monday to Saturday between 10am and 4pm (the busiest time 
for both car and pedestrian traffic) via Saddler Street, the Peninsula’s only access 
thoroughfare (DCC, 2003). The exit (see Figure 3) is controlled during the charging 
period by an automatic rising bollard that is dropped upon payment (the machine 
accepts coins and cards, while annual permit holders can lower the bollard by using a 
transponder). The exit charge allows free flow of vehicles into the area, preventing 
traffic queues back to a nearby major road. 
It was estimated before the implementation that there would be a 50% reduction in 
vehicle access to the area. For the remaining traffic, a very generous 70% would have 
permits and 30% would be liable to pay. The first evaluation of the scheme (DCC, 
2003) showed the reduction of vehicles to be around 85% so the permit allocation, 
despite the fact that it seemed generous, has not affected the scheme’s traffic reduction 
impact. 
 
 
Figure 3: The exit charge point from the Durham Peninsula. (Photo: P. Ieromonachou) 
 
4. Italy 
 
Contrary to the UK, Italy has a long tradition of toll roads (motorways, tunnels and 
bridges) even though this did not extent to the urban road network. Among growing 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 49-68 
 55
efforts to reduce the serious pollution caused by congested traffic, some Italian 
municipalities explored access control in Limited Traffic Zones (LTZ)4. These controlled 
zones usually cover the historic city centres. Only residents of the area and a limited 
number of permit holders are allowed to access the zones. The city of Bologna 
pioneered the policy in the mid/late 1980’s, and despite initial difficulties, this prompted 
a widespread adoption of the measure. In other towns and cities, the policy is gradually 
evolving to a hybrid form of road pricing by requesting LTZ permit holders to pay an 
annual fee. To achieve this, a directive (known as “D.L. 285/92” in Italy) was 
introduced, that allows Municipalities to charge motor vehicles a fee when entering or 
circulating inside the LTZ. A presidential decree 250/99 approved the installation and 
operation of automatic access control systems in historic centres and LTZs. The 
following cases of Rome and Genoa record the experiments carried out in these two 
cities in order to establish the political and public acceptability required to implement a 
full-scale scheme and the technological advances from the early manual access control 
to the modern electronic on-board transponders. 
 
 
4.1 Rome 
 
High car growth rates and unbearable levels of atmospheric pollution that endangered 
not only residents but also the cultural heritage of historic buildings in the city centre, 
has forced Rome to revise its transport strategy. For years, development was centred on 
accommodating the private car but in the mid 1980s, the municipality decided on a 
series of measures to reduce the negative externalities of car use (Comune di Roma, 
2000). The measures focused on increasing the sustainable modes of transport and on 
raising awareness of the negative impacts of the car among citizens. Among the most 
important measures were: 
 Access restrictions and integrated pricing strategies, 
 Collective passenger transport, new forms of vehicle use, 
 New concepts for the distribution of goods, 
 Innovative soft measures, and 
 Integration of transport management systems and clean technology public and 
private fleets. 
The most radical and difficult to implement were the first two, which concerned the 
implementation of an Access Control system followed by experiments for a Road 
Pricing scheme. To address acceptability issues and provide a fall back, the 
municipality proceeded to implement the scheme in incremental steps. The historic 
centre of Rome was classified as a Limited Traffic Zone (LTZ) in 1989. A manual 
system was implemented at that time that would only allow residents and permit holders 
to enter. The measures were not enforced very strictly for a number of years, and there 
were many violations with no action taken against offenders (Forestieri and Tomassini, 
1999). In some way, both users and the police knew that the restrictions were not 
followed in a systematic way. This dramatically changed in 1994 when concrete blocks 
were used to prevent entry into the LTZ, physically and visually reinforcing the policy 
of access control. Permission for entry was given to residents and a few other 
exceptions such as emergency services. 
                                                 
4 In Italian: ZTL (Zona a Traffico Limitato) 
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Evolution from access control to road pricing was seen as a natural progression 
(€UROPRICE, 2001). The introduction of automated enforcement in 1998, paved the 
way for a road pricing scheme. After some years of planning and consultations, an 
experiment began in 2001 in the LTZ (Musso and Corazza, 2003). The period 1998 to 
2001 also served to develop and install the electronic system of on-board charging units 
and gantries. The system in Rome, based on existing motorway tolling technology 
(Pasquali, 2001), became operational in August 2001 but enforcement started later, in 
October 2001. The system initially targeted specific categories (e.g. commercial 
vehicles) and gradually was applied to all road users. From Monday through Friday 
(6.30 am to 6 pm) and Saturday (2 pm to 6 pm) only permit holders are allowed to enter 
the restricted zone in Rome. There are a total of 135,000 permit holders that include 
residents, disabled people, taxi drivers and city services, which can access the zone free 
of charge. In addition to these are the 20,000 authorised individuals allowed to pay the 
fee to enter the zone (€UROPRICE, 2000). The price  of an annual permit is the 
equivalent cost of a 12-month public transport card which costs €3405 (£233). 
Electronic access detection equipment records illegal access of vehicles at 23 ‘gates’ 
leading to the restricted zone. The electronic system ‘reads’ the vehicles number plates 
and reports offenders who are then fined. The total number of plates permitted to access 
the LTZ represents about 8.5% of the total vehicles in the city (€UROPRICE, 2002b). 
Research is underway by STA into reading the small-sized number plates of 
motorcycles; this could lead to including them in future access restrictions. 
Between 2003 and 2004, two other smaller restricted access experiments took place in 
areas adjacent to the central LTZ in Rome. The difference was that they operated at 
night (see Figure 4). The first ‘nocturnal’ LTZ concerned San Lorenzo, an area nearby 
the University of Rome associated with student clubs and other youth oriented 
entertainment – activities that resulted in atmospheric and noise pollution from misuse 
and overcrowding of vehicles. The San Lorenzo experiment took place between 4 June 
and 31 October of 2003, excluding August6, for five nights a week from Wednesday 
until Sunday, from 8 pm until 3 am (Comune di Roma, 2003). The other experiment 
concerned the ‘gastronomic’ area of Rome, Trastevere, a favourite area for dining, 
where from 7 May until 9 October 2004, for two nights of the week – Friday and 
Saturday, entrance to cars was forbidden from 9 pm until 3 am (Comune di Roma, 
2004). 
The main objectives of both experiments were to provide a more enjoyable and safer 
environment for pedestrians accessing the two areas and test if the traffic limiting 
measures had a positive effect on business. Access to the areas was complemented with 
extra night bus and tram services. In addition, Rome linked parking to the road pricing 
scheme. This involved parking charge zones, with charges rising the closer the parking 
is to the city centre. The idea is to encourage parking at the periphery in order to reduce 
inner city congestion. 
 
                                                 
5 2004 prices 
6 August is traditionally considered a month reserved for holidays and as such was not included. Traffic 
levels were expected to be lower. 
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Figure 4: An overhead VMS (Variable Message Sign) warning of the ‘nocturnal’ access control scheme 
in Trastevere in May 2004. (Photo: P. Ieromonachou). 
 
 
4.2 Genoa 
 
The city of Genoa is situated in a narrow strip of land between the Apennine 
Mountains in the north and the Ligurian Sea. The city extends along 30km of coast and 
two valleys spreading northwards. Genoa’s distinctive geographical characteristics 
resulted in the way in which the urban structure of the city developed. Average 
population density is 2,600/km2 but rises to 10,150/km2 within the city centre (Comune 
di Genova, 2003). Combined with a perception of inadequate road infrastructure, these 
factors can be greatly held responsible for the existing environmental problems caused 
from traffic congestion. One of the worst affected areas in Genoa is the centre of the 
city, which includes the main retail and historic areas. The municipality of Genoa 
responded to the growing traffic related environmental problems with proposals for 
various measures that included the introduction of road pricing measures in the centre 
(€UROPRICE, 2000). 
A new Urban Traffic Plan (Comune di Genova, 2000) formed part of a civic 
regeneration that included plans to limit traffic related pollution and annoyance in the 
historic city centre and to revitalise the commercial centre of the city. Various measures 
proposed by the municipality of Genoa in their plan included: 
 Optimising parking zones according to the surrounding land use, 
 Constructing an elevated relief road (“supraelevata”) that bypasses the centre to 
improve the main Traffic flow from the harbour, 
 Favouring public transport, 
 Improving the connections between different travel modes, 
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 Regulating and reducing traffic in the centre through the creation of a series of one-
way roads, and 
 Introducing an area-based pricing scheme. 
The municipality of Genoa intended to implement a full scale road pricing scheme in 
the historic and retail areas in the centre mainly to reduce transit traffic. But difficulties 
relating to the general management of the project, the political and public acceptability 
as well as resistance from some stakeholders made it necessary to perform a 
demonstration beforehand (€UROPRICE, 2002a). An experimental road pricing scheme 
was tested in 2003 in part of the existing LTZ (Limited Traffic Zone) that covers the 
historic centre of Genoa. The full cordon was planned to be 2.5 km2 whereas the trial 
zone was about 1 km2. This ‘trial’ scheme was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
a road pricing scheme in the area including traffic volume reduction, the use of 
alternative modes in accessing the area and the general environmental benefits. Another 
important aim was to test the technological equipment. Genoa, like Rome, favoured a 
system of gates based on plate recognition and central software data processing. 
The six month road pricing trial, using 200 volunteer drivers, took place in two three-
month phases (Mastretta, 2003). The first phase between March and May 2003 was 
conducted with a €2 charge and the second (June – August 2003) with a €1 (£0.7) 
charge. Genoa installed optical character recognition (OCR) equipment at seven entry 
gates. The gates were also equipped with video cameras (see Figure 5) that linked each 
gate with the traffic control centre. The volunteers were assigned a ‘virtual budget’ to 
use during the trial. From the initial sample of volunteers, 159 completed the 
demonstration. From the statistical analysis of the trial results and a modelling study, a 
38% reduction of entrances to the zone was found to correspond to a €1.5 (£1.03) 
charge (Contursi, 2004). A lower charge resulted in more crossings and vice versa. 
Overall, the road pricing trials attempted to make the system easy to understand for all 
involved. It also addressed all the social, economical, environmental, technological and 
organisational issues for the stakeholders in the network. 
 
Figure 5: One of the entry gates in Genoa with similar type cameras and OCR equipment enlarged on the 
right. (Photo: P. Ieromonachou). 
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Whether Genoa’s Access Control scheme evolves to road pricing depends on a 
number of objectives and new work packages associated with achieving the overall 
aims. The following, constitute a brief summary of the objectives set by the 
Municipality of Genoa (Comune di Genova, 2004) in their projected activities towards a 
system of tariff-based access control. The report also includes a detailed list of complex 
and interrelated work packages (approximately 23) covering all aspects of the system. 
These issues are broken down into the major work themes which are to: encompass the 
public and political acceptability, allow for a good level of mobility, aim to reduce 
private traffic, address parking, account for the cost and structure of public transport, 
support integrated transport modes, explore innovative and alternative forms of 
transport, conduct a study of potential infrastructure work (such as the gantries shown in 
Figure 5), analyse different charging scenarios and investigate user payment options. It 
was evident that the road pricing trials were more than just an ‘experiment’. The depth 
of consideration shows that the municipality is earnest about advancing the policy to a 
full-scale implementation, although volatile politics in Italian cities always raise 
uncertainties. 
 
 
5. Case comparisons and SPNM analysis 
 
The four case studies discussed in this paper include the two capital cities from each 
country as well as two smaller cities. All the examples have been introduced in a 
roughly similar timeline and demonstrate the shift in European policy in the last few 
years towards stronger traffic demand management than has been evident in the past. 
Table 1 summarises the key aspects of the road pricing schemes in the four cities. 
The comparison of the design of the schemes, although useful, says little about the 
processes involved in how the designs evolved and became implemented. The main 
challenge faced by demand management policies, and road pricing schemes in 
particular, is not in their design, but their effective implementation and support. It is 
these aspects that are the focus of the SPNM framework. This maps the factors such as 
the network of stakeholders involved, their motivations and expectations of a scheme, 
how they provided support and ‘protection’ for the scheme and how learning occurs.  
 
Table 1: Summary of main characteristics of the study cities. 
 
 London Durham Rome Genoa 
City population 7 500 000 85 000 2 800 000 622 000 
Percentage living inside 
charging area (%) 
2 < 0.1 1.5 - 
Charging Area (km2) 21 0.35 5.5 1 (test area) 
Number of charge 
points 
174 1 22 6 
Average daily crossings 
during toll hours 
205 000 239 70 000 47 000 
Daily entry charge for a 
small vehicle 
£5 GBP 
(€7.3) 
£2 GBP 
(€2.95) 
€340 (Annual) 
(£233) 
€1.5 
(£1.03) 
Annual gross revenue 
(millions) 
£90 GBP 
(€131) 
£0.05 GBP 
(€0.07) 
€8.5 
(£5.8 GBP) 
€1.72 
(£1.18) 
Charging period Mon - Fri 
7am – 6.30 pm 
Mon – Sat 
10 am – 4 pm 
Mon – Fri 
6.30 am – 6 pm 
Sat 2 pm – 6 pm 
Mon – Fri 
6.30 am – 6 pm 
Starting/Trial date Feb 2003 Oct 2002 Oct 2001 March-August  2003 
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The following represent a short version of the SPNM framework that lists and 
explores the critical factors identified in the four cases of this paper that relate to the 
success of the road pricing schemes. SPNM is used for analysing the cases and at the 
same time uses the results to further develop its analytical capability, as SPNM is still a 
method under development. 
 
 
Partner-Actor Networks 
 
The first stage of SPNM analysis is to identify the Partner-Actor network for 
developing and implementing a policy initiative. In SPNM, a distinction is made 
between two groups: (a) those actively involved in the planning, implementation and 
operation of a scheme, the partners and (b) users and other groups that were indirectly 
involved in the decision making process, the actors. Thus partners are those who 
together implement the road pricing scheme, whereas the actors are those affected by it 
and whose support is needed to win acceptance. A network of partners and actors was 
apparent in all the investigated cases, but the level of involvement of each group 
differed in each project. SPNM examines how these networks are formed and how they 
hold together. 
 
Figure 6: Combined diagram of Network of Partners and Actors in the Durham Road Access Charge 
scheme (Ieromonachou, 2005). 
 
All cities required a wide partner network to implement their respective schemes and 
this involved a complex project planning system. The Italian schemes had an initial 
network in place. The networks were partly established since the introduction of the 
Access Control schemes. For the UK cases, the networks had to be largely created 
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anew. Durham did try initially to introduce Access Control using a very restricted 
network but that failed (DCC, 2000). Later, Durham identified and empowered a wide 
range of community stakeholders by developing relationships with actors and drawing 
them in to become partners (see Figure 6, Adapted from Ieromonachou et al., 2004.). 
London had all vital partners grouped under the aegis of one ‘lead player’, Transport for 
London (TfL) which was headed by the champion of the scheme, the Mayor of London. 
 
 
Project champion 
 
Where projects involve complex systems of partners and actors, the management 
process usually needs a mechanism to provide focus and drive. This is particularly so 
for innovative projects involving the creation of new networks. This role is one that can 
be filled by project champions - charismatic individuals that spearhead projects. A 
project champion can stimulate the learning and acceptance process. Support of 
politicians is vital to the introduction of any road-pricing scheme whether a charismatic 
project champion exists or not. The project champion emerges as a critical part of the 
process of getting the charging system into place. All projects examined had some type 
of champion figure but this varied, with the role being an individual (London) or a 
coalition (Rome, Genoa) or community group (Durham). In some places (like London) 
the champions held special places (such as a government office) and their personal 
motivation could have linked to motives beyond the scope of transport policy. 
 
 
Expectations – Motivations 
 
The next stage in SPNM analysis is to explore the motivations and the extent to which 
the different expectations of partners and actors come together. Many of the parties 
taking part bring their own notions, values and beliefs with them. These may be 
summarised as their motivations. When examined, motivations help explain why each 
group originally became involved in a road pricing scheme and the amount of 
commitment they have towards it. Sometimes motivations are very obvious and in some 
cases they develop or evolve as the scheme progresses. Motivations are intrinsically 
linked to the expected outcome of the scheme. These expectations of partners and actors 
are useful to analyse for many reasons. It is critical to find out how the expectations of 
different partners and actors gradually become aligned and, for this to happen, a shift in 
expectations would have occurred. A potential danger sign is where a scheme involves 
partner and actors who have very different expectations and conflicting motivations. 
It is notable that behind the transport reasons for the road pricing schemes, there were 
deeper motivations. For example, protection of historical buildings was of great 
importance in Rome, and Genoa as well as Durham. Historical heritage is a sensitive 
issue for many cities in Italy, more so in Rome where the LTZ covers most of the 
ancient city and therefore protection of the built environment from pollution becomes 
necessary. In London, although the transport policies of which road pricing was part, 
did produce some benefits to historical areas (e.g. in Trafalgar Square), the main 
motivation was the economic cost of congestion and the direct transport benefits. 
Tapping into the core motivation of key actor groups is therefore important. In Durham, 
groups that would otherwise be seen as actors in the scheme were brought in the 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 49-68 
 62
network as partners. They were given responsibilities and thus were able to voice their 
concerns and have more input into the scheme by working through their motivations 
and exploring expectations. 
 
 
Protection measures 
 
These are complementary actions benefiting users to support road pricing policies. 
These can take two forms: (a) Enhancement Protection, which are actions that 
complement the effect of road pricing (like the provision of extra public transport 
capacity to facilitate modal shift from car, subsidies to reduce public transport ticket 
prices, reallocating road space for pedestrians and bicycles etc.); (b) Compensation 
Protection, where there are full or part exemptions from charges for certain groups of 
users, for social or transport policy reasons. Typically the latter include buses, taxis, 
disabled drivers and local residents. 
Both types of protection measures are particularly needed for innovative or unfamiliar 
policy measures and link into the level of acceptance achieved (considered below). 
Enhancement Protection measures featured strongly in the London and Durham 
schemes. A major part of protection in London was enhancing public transport services 
and the London experience shows how much can be accomplished in a relatively short 
amount of time and with relatively low capital (i.e. an extra 300 buses). Durham also 
introduced the ‘Cathedral Bus’ service to provide alternative access to the charging 
area. Subsidy and service improvement was more important in the UK because there 
was little alternative available or the capacity was not adequate and fares were high. 
One contrast with the Italian road pricing schemes is a lesser emphasis on Enhancement 
Protection measures. This seems to be because they did not have to further enhance 
their public transport system as it was already highly developed and under heavy 
subsidy. They did, however, introduce electric scooter hire. For Compensation 
Protection, actions were more similar. In both Italy and the UK there were exemptions 
for buses, taxis, residents, accessibility groups and services. 
 
 
Network Learning 
 
From SPNM theory, niche development depends on the local level of innovation 
processes and stakeholders behaviour. If the innovations (in this paper concerning road 
pricing policies) are successful, then the niche they create will become known and may 
be adopted more widely. Niche development can be evaluated by the level of learning 
and the level of institutional embedding. Hoogma et al. (2002, p.28) appreciate the 
learning that occurs through a range of processes of articulating “relevant technology, 
market and other properties” but enhance this notion by suggesting that a second-order 
learning is required for niche development to result in a regime shift. This form of 
learning will involve a co-evolutionary learning (Wynne, 1995) that will draw in the 
partners and actors involved in the scheme but also third parties like governments that 
can help in the institutional and societal embedding. Learning processes need to extend 
beyond the immediate local network of stakeholders. This is where the wider issue 
arises of what contributes to acceptance of a policy measure. 
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Each of the four cities presented in the paper used incremental processes but in 
different ways. As noted in the above case study, Durham had a long history of 
attempted solutions (that generally failed) until it reached the successful access charge 
system. London had also tried various traffic management options but as these were not 
deemed effective, the congestion charge emerged as the only solution. The congestion 
charging scheme itself is incremental, in that it uses a basic technology that can be 
upgraded once the scheme is established. Radical policies with eventually large scale 
changes can be planned and introduced incrementally. Genoa has experimented with 
road pricing to facilitate learning. It was felt that this pre-implementation stage was 
needed as there was insufficient political support to go for immediate implementation. 
A key point that SPNM analysis seeks to identify is that experimentation, adaptation 
and even failure are inherent in learning. An SPNM approach cannot be about the 
mechanistic implementation of a pre-defined solution, but about experimentation and 
learning. The lessons might be that a policy is wrong or unacceptable and a different 
measure is needed. At this point, Genoa is still debating whether to go ahead with a full-
scale road pricing scheme or not. 
All the successful schemes have used an incremental approach with flexibility to 
experiment and adapt. As noted above, this is consistent with SPNM theory that 
identifies the need for experimentation and adaptation. As the process unfolds, many of 
the barriers would be (or in effect seen) as less dramatic. Radical policies require a 
relatively un-complicated start and a pre-defined ‘test’ phase that would allow for 
problems like political and public acceptability to gradually normalise. An important 
part of learning by the network of partners and actors involves understanding user needs 
and attitudes towards policy measures such as road pricing. The actor/partner network’s 
assessment of user attitudes has, of course, already influenced them through the factors 
of expectations/motivations and has been reflected in the design of protection measures. 
However, this is indirect and therefore a separate category is viewed as necessary taking 
the user perspective of the policy.  
 
User Learning/Acceptance 
 
The social and political acceptance of road pricing by users plays a central role in the 
feasibility of implementing a road-pricing programme. A number of studies took place 
in order to establish the social aspects and acceptability of transport pricing policies in 
the UK (Jones, 1998; Preston et al, 2000; Rajé, 2003; Verhoef et al., 1997). In the UK, 
Ison (2000) found that approximately 80% of surveyed people viewed urban road 
pricing as being publicly unacceptable. Other studies showed the acceptability of road 
pricing depends upon perceived benefits and the justification given for the development 
of such a programme in the selected area (Jones, 1998, Schade & Schlag 2003). This 
links in to the SPNM factors of motivation/expectation and protection measures. 
It is clearly important to take into consideration both in the design and 
implementation of the scheme the views that arise within the general public. 
Acceptability needs to be considered seriously by implementers and government 
officials. Empirical literature shows that the public still has little knowledge of the 
possibilities of pricing policies as solutions to traffic congestion over other policies. 
Incremental approaches permit learning and enhance understanding and acceptance. 
The UK and Italian schemes started from different user experiences. In Italy, road 
pricing existed in the form of tolled motorways and urban road pricing is an extension 
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of an accepted practice, city centre access control. In the UK there was little experience 
of road charges or even city centre access control zones, which meant that the London 
and Durham schemes involved something entirely new. In all cases, acceptance of road 
pricing required a widespread acceptance that it was needed to address an accepted 
problem. In London and Durham it was congestion; in Italy, this was linked with the 
protection of the architectural heritage of the historical centres and other environmental 
improvements. It is essential that the charging scheme is seen as a solution to an 
accepted problem. A road pricing policy needs to be introduced incrementally to 
facilitate learning, with complementary protection measures that support the learning 
process. The policy needs to be flexible, so that it can then be adapted and, if failing, 
rejected. 
 
 
6. Concluding discussion 
 
Using the SPNM framework helps to identify key factors that contributed to the 
success, or were a weakness, in the road pricing cases covered in this paper. The SPNM 
framework also helps to show where there are common lessons, despite the clear 
differences in the scale and context of the four UK and Italian schemes discussed in this 
paper. 
The small Durham congestion-charging scheme appears remarkably successful in that 
it reduced traffic levels in the Peninsula area while satisfying the concerns of all major 
stakeholders. Although it is a modest project, how this has been achieved, contains 
lessons that could apply elsewhere. Perhaps most importantly were the presence of 
strong political leadership from both the elected representatives and the officials of the 
County Council who campaigned many years for the scheme. Secondly, the traffic 
problem in the area was well recognised by most people in the city, who were thus easy 
to convince that serious action was needed. This was helped by the nature of the site 
(with the World Heritage site of the Cathedral and Castle) which provided an added 
incentive for action to restrict traffic. Thirdly, the access charge was proposed as an 
alternative to a total ban on vehicular access, and can thus be seen as a relatively benign 
measure in comparison. Milder measures had been attempted and had clearly not 
worked (Ieromonachou et al. 2004). The access charge ended up being just the latest in 
a whole series of measures aimed at gradually restricting traffic access to the Peninsula. 
The small size and scope of the scheme (with the charge only applying to a single road) 
made the scheme technically simple to introduce with relatively few people directly 
affected. Overall there were strong motivations and learning and acceptance of road 
pricing was well advanced before the scheme went into place. Fourthly, the charging 
policy was preceded by improvements to public transport access, coupled with 
extensive compensation protection measures. Finally, there was the active involvement 
and empowerment, not only of partners but also of actor groups which ultimately helped 
the County Council achieve consensus in expectations and support for charging. 
In the case of London there were several elements necessary for success already in 
place, not least a very committed political champion, an almost unanimous acceptance 
of the transport problem, and a list of well-known and suitable objectives. In addition, 
there was also a relatively broad coalition of support for the scheme itself from some of 
the key actor stakeholders – in particular from business. However, there remained 
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strong opposition to Congestion Charging in London from some groups, and the local 
media adopted a very negative stance (LTT, 2004; 2005) – as it does to almost any 
transport issue (Ryley, 2005). This suggests that learning processes are incomplete.  
Providing alternative public transport in London with buses (enhancement protection) 
proved a more successful solution than possibly expected. The boost in bus use helped 
the scheme’s acceptance levels and kept costs down. A similar issue arose with the 
charging system. The camera system was criticised as expensive and not 100% accurate 
as well as being visually obtrusive. But it constituted tested technology that could easily 
and quickly be put in place in time for the proposed start date. In the end it proved 
remarkably versatile and relatively trouble free. At the early implementation stages, the 
technology was not critical. An incremental evolution in the technology path could 
easily follow a successful scheme. 
One of the main factors emerging from the Rome case is the importance of the 
community and the protection of the cities’ architectural heritage, and there are 
examples of this force working for or against the transport policy of ‘access control’. 
For example although the control of traffic through the access control schemes was 
important to protect the ancient city structures in both Roma and Genoa, there was the 
opposing motivation of the negative impact of the roadside hardware (posts, concrete 
curbs, cameras). This might be thought of as a ‘tactical’ problem compared to the 
‘strategic’-level of the traffic restraint policy as a whole. However, such tactical details 
can seriously affect acceptance and support for a policy measure such as road pricing. 
This presented a serious dilemma for planners who had to work with expert groups to 
ensure the entry gate system was appropriate for Rome. Models were created using 
computer generated images (Forestieri and Tomassini, 1999) to ensure conservation of 
the urban fabric. In Durham too, architectural heritage was an important motivation 
(being an UNESCO World Heritage Site), but here the much simpler scheme meant that 
there was just a small barrier at the exit point from the site. In London, visual intrusion 
has been less of an issue – maybe because there already is an overload of street 
furniture in the capital city, or maybe perhaps London’s architecture is not viewed in 
the same way as the other locations. 
Overall, the use of the SPNM framework to analyse the UK and Italian road pricing 
schemes has helped highlight a number of key issues in the process leading up to and 
implementing this radical traffic control measure. Where there have been differences, 
the SPNM framework has helped to identify why they have occurred and how they have 
contributed to the outcome of each city’s scheme. Particular insights that emerged from 
this research, and which could be useful in implementing road pricing elsewhere, were: 
 Managing the partner network for implementing a road pricing scheme can be a 
complex task. This can involve new skills and tasks than are normally involved in more 
traditional local transport measures; 
 Identifying and understanding core motivations of actors that the measure could 
support - these may only be indirectly related to transport (e.g. cultural image, economic 
impacts, prestige, well being etc.; 
 Extending beyond the partner network to the actor network that provides support for 
a road pricing scheme. Understanding, informing and empowering actor groups is 
important for winning widespread acceptability; 
 Radical policies need a ‘champion’ to spearhead their implementation, but 
champions can take many forms; 
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 Learning occurs at many levels and in many ways. However, it is important for a 
new scheme to build on existing processes and measures to promote learning. If 
possible, build on what you know already, in terms of understanding, motivations and 
experience, rather than trying to get people and organisations to do something totally 
new. Incremental advances can be made in many different ways. 
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